The Death of the Cedar Revolution

by: Zach Paikin

What a difference four years makes. Four years ago, Lebanon’s government was clearly pro-Western and most certainly anti-Islamist, anti-Syria and anti-Iran. The country has now tragically been absorbed into the anti-Western, revolutionary Islamist supporting Iran-Syria axis.

Let’s provide a little historical context: In 2005, the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, undoubtedly by Syrian agents (and possibly with the help of Hezbollah), sparked the non-violent “Cedar Revolution”. The latter resulted in Syrian forces ending their 30-year occupation of Lebanon.

The Lebanese had endured enough since the 1975 civil war and the end of totalitarian influence in Lebanese politics appeared to be coming to an end. Despite this, several factors contributed to the situation we have today.

First, Israel’s inability to destroy the Iranian proxy terrorist group Hezbollah in the summer war of 2006 resulted in unprecedented confidence and influence for the self-designated “Party of God”. Hezbollah effectively demonstrated that it was capable of firing thousands of rockets at a foreign country over a very short period of time. In addition, Hezbollah proved that it could conduct raids against Israeli soldiers in Israeli territory, which resulted in the death of Eldad Regev and Ehud Goldwasser.

Hezbollah’s confidence was further bolstered by the failure of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701. The resolution was meant to ensure that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) remained the only military group in Lebanon. Hezbollah’s militant units had undermined Lebanese sovereignty because of their control of the entire southern part of the country. (A sovereign state, definitionally, has a monopoly on violence within its territory.)

A consequence of the 2006 Hezbollah-Israel War was the end of the Israeli naval blockade of Lebanon. This, among other factors, has facilitated the stockpiling of 40,000 Iranian and Syrian rockets by Hezbollah. Other military achievements for Hezbollah include their covert bases in Syria, their acquisition of SCUD missiles from the Syrian regime, and their brief seizure of West Beirut neighbourhoods in 2008.

Third, Hezbollah’s growth post-2006 wasn’t simply limited to the military. It has since managed to portray itself as a Lebanese nationalist movement (not simply an Islamist one). The political results have been resounding. Despite the defeat of the Hezbollah-backed pro-Syrian “March 8^th Coalition” in the June 2009 parliamentary elections, Hezbollah has managed to obtain more than one third of the seats in Lebanon's cabinet.

Hezbollah’s political savvy doesn’t stop there. We have seen the head of  Hezbollah,Hassan Nasrallah, meet publicly with former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. Hezbollah’s television station, Al-Manar, is broadcast in many European countries. Also, Hezbollah’s manipulation of the media during its 2006 war with Israel proves that their public relations department’s influence should be taken into account.

Fourth, Iran’s growing influence in and radicalization of the Shiite population of Lebanon extends beyond Hezbollah. A non-negligible portion of the Lebanese Christian population has fled the country due to persecution. Furthermore, the LAF attack Israeli soldiers in Israeli territory this summer, committed by a Shiite brigade, shows that Iran is capable of manipulating the LAF--and arguably the Lebanese government--for its own political interests.

Following Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s recent visit to Lebanon, clearly a symbol of growing Iranian influence in the country, we now await the results of a UN tribunal investigating the murder of Rafik Hariri. If Hezbollah is accused, then renewed major domestic conflict in Lebanon could erupt, the result of which could be increased Syrian military control and Iranian political power in the region. Indeed, Hezbollah’s unrest is evidenced by recent attacks on UN officials in Lebanon.

With a possible Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities in the near future, the West needs to take Iran’s funding of revolutionary Islamists more seriously. Hezbollah’s participation in the ensuing Iranian retaliation may result in Israeli strikes on Lebanese infrastructure, the political results of which may be unclear. Will Hezbollah and its allies be yet again deterred, or will the theocratic regime in Iran take the opportunity to further increase its stranglehold over Lebanese politics?

Political stability, economic growth and reform of the moderates who have succumbed to the status-quo will be essential in halting Iran’s regional hegemonic aspirations. Iran now shares a border with Israel. President Ahmadinejad has explicitly stated that he will use South Lebanon to fight Israel in future wars. The time to stop Iran’s revolutionary Islamist ideology from taking over the region is now.

Suggested Reading:

"Everybody, it Seems, Worries About There Being no Moratorium on Settlements. I Don't. I Worry that Lebanon is About to Collapse," Martin Peretz, The New Republic

"Hizbullah making preparations to seize power in Beirut," Jerusalem Post

"In Mid-East House of Cards, U.S. Views Lebanon as Shaky," Mark Landler, New York Times

"A century of dispute peaks in South Beirut" Rami G. Khouri, The Daily Star